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In this paper, we consider the phenomenon of “pedagogical violence” — infliction of physical, social, 
emotional, or psychological pains, or threat of such pains that is either the means for or non-accidental 
by-products of education used on a systematic basis. Pedagogical violence is often used for promoting 
certain desired learning in students. Alternatively, it can emerge as a violent reaction in students and 
teachers to particular educational settings directed against other students or teachers. In this paper, we 
review some of the debates and controversial issues around pedagogical violence, and we use a variety 
of illustrative examples to explore in more detail what pedagogical violence means in particular 
contexts. We argue that pedagogical violence is a natural consequence of alienated instrumental 
education. We will look at teachers’ desire to avoid physical and psychosocial pedagogical violence. We 
specifically consider diverse forms of psychosocial pedagogical violence and its issues such as: 
summative assessment, epistemological pedagogical violence, students’ ambivalence around 
pedagogical violence, rehabilitating/avoiding pedagogical violence through a carnival. We finish with a 
reflection about what can be done to minimize pedagogical violence. Our analysis heavily relies on the 
Bakhtinian theoretical framework of critical ontological dialogism. 
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“I believe behavior comes before learning” 
The head of a high school science department in one of 
US schools, 2016 
 
“Although teachers do care and do work very, very 
hard, the institution is psychopathic – it has no 
conscience. It rings a bell and the young man in the 
middle of writing a poem must close his notebook and 
move to a different cell where he must memorize that 
humans and monkeys derive from a common 
ancestor.”  
John Taylor Gatto1 
Introduction 
The concept of “pedagogical violence” is unfortunately not a new one.  While we would like to 
think that the term “pedagogical violence” is an oxymoron, it is established through the literature that it 
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is instead almost a tautology, with violence endemic in the concept of pedagogy.  Freire’s (1970) 
“pedagogy of the oppressed” opened our eyes to the linkage between pedagogy, oppression, and 
violence with his distinction between dialogue (for Freire – open and voluntary social organization) and 
anti-dialogue (manipulation, violence, coercion) to move towards a non-violent pedagogy. 
Since Freire, many others have also drawn attention to the concept of violence in pedagogy but 
Foucault (1995), Bourdieu and Passeron (1990), and Worsham (1998) provide us with the first clear 
exposition of the term “pedagogical violence,” by drawing a relationship between the “pedagogical 
violence” of the institutional, bureaucratic pedagogical system, subjugation and the emotional life that 
is organized by such pedagogy. Pedagogical violence occurs when teachers, parents, other students, or 
school bring intentionally or unintentionally psychological or physical pains (including threats of pains) in 
a student to promote the student's important learning. Probably the best example of pedagogical 
violence is school corporal punishment – once ubiquitous now disgraced and fading gradually away 
around the globe2. However, as we show in our paper, although physical pedagogical violence has been 
gradually fading, it has been replaced with everyday psycho-social and relational pedagogical violence. 
Pedagogical violence is often justified by a belief that in the long run, the student will appreciate 
this pain as necessary and even desirable, which essentially establishes the teacher-student 
“sadomasochistic” relationship. We use the qualifier “sadomasochistic” as a literary metaphor of a 
pedagogical ideology justifying pedagogical violence rather than to refer to a psychological 
phenomenon, although at times, it can include literal enjoyment or, at least, appreciation of violence for 
some participants.  According to this ideology, a good teacher should strive for inflicting effective, 
justified, and necessary pedagogical violence (i.e., pedagogical “sadism”) and a good student should 
greatly appreciate it as it leads to his/her learning to be appreciated now or in the future (i.e., 
pedagogical “masochism”). Linguists have established that the etymology of the majority of educational 
terms in diverse languages often refers to some level of pedagogical violence, whereby a teacher 
violently imposes on a student something that the student may not wish to do on his or her own; “the 
root of the [Hebrew] word for teach/learn (דמל) coincided with that for the goad, specifically the one 
used to prod cattle” (Moore, 2009, p. 422). 
Pedagogical non-negotiable imposition is arguably the heart of modern conventional 
institutionalized education (Matusov, 2015). It probably comes from a deep-rooted societal conviction 
that since by definition a student is one who is ignorant and inept, the student cannot define and shape 
her or his own education – education must be imposed on the student without any negotiation. Many 
students, especially young ones, do not choose whether to engage in education or not –education is 
imposed on them. Many students do not choose what to study – the curriculum is imposed on them. 
Many students do not choose what educational activities to experience – the assignments are imposed 
on them. Many students do not choose to ask their teachers for help – the guidance is imposed on 
them. Many students do not choose to be around other students or particular teachers – the peers and 
the teachers are imposed on them. Many students do not choose a particular place and time to study – 
the time-space is imposed on them. Many students do not choose particular ways of communication 
and participation in the classroom (or even whether to communicate or participate) – the particular 
ways of communication and participation are imposed on them. Many students do not choose to expose 
their work or study for the teacher’s assessment – the assessment is imposed on them. In short, most 
students do not have any voice about their education. The students are expected to submit their will, 
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desire, heart, mind, feelings, behavior, and attitudes for non-conditional cooperation with the teachers’, 
schools’, and test makers’ demands. Teachers, schools, adults, and, finally, society know best what is 
good for the ignorant and inept students. When students successfully finish their institutionalized 
education, they are expected to appreciate this education, and these non-negotiable forcible often 
painful impositions.  
As this conviction goes, left to their own devices, many students may not choose education for 
themselves at all, but even those who may choose, may not choose proper education, proper 
curriculum, and proper instruction. Thus, education has to be forced on the students, and this use of 
force has to be backed up with violence – i.e., measured applications of pains. Arguably, this may come 
from “a religious custom of telling the congregation of what they should and should not do. The 
widespread conviction that teaching is about telling, learning is about listening, and knowledge is about 
clear-cut factual information owes a great deal to the history of religion” (Robert L. Hampel, personal 
communication, January 23, 2017). 
In our paper, we want to consider reasons, justifications, and conditions for pedagogical 
violence, its types, its spread and trends, its link with pedagogy, and the issue of its desirability and 
unavoidability in education.  
  
What is pedagogical violence? 
In an excellent essay on violence, Graeber (2015) makes the point that bureaucracies (a system 
of rules, procedures) have violence at their heart, insofar as rules and procedures can ultimately only be 
enforced by violence, including its threat, by suppressing any dissent, incompliance, or resistance. In 
modern bureaucratic societies, behind rules, regulations, procedures, court decisions, and laws there 
hovers “soft violence” in its shadow. Soft violence is based on the infliction of psycho-social and 
relational pains of eviction, exclusion, ostracism, arrest, imprisonment, fines, and so on. However, as 
Graeber argues, behind “soft violence” there hovers the shadow of “hard violence” of physical pains 
administrated by police, army, and guards (cf. Foucault, 1995). The bureaucratic system itself is blind to 
“value” or “stupidity” but enforces the rules of whatever the system demands through recourse to 
violence or the threat of violence – or various means of manipulation, “Violence's capacity to allow 
arbitrary decisions, and thus to avoid the kind of debate, clarification, and renegotiation typical of more 
egalitarian social relations, is obviously what allows its victims to see procedures created on the basis of 
violence as stupid or unreasonable" (Graeber, 2015, p. 66). In rule-following and form-filling, 
bureaucracy renders people who disagree with it “stupid” and is ultimately able to enlist officials (e.g. 
the police, state bureaucrats, or psychiatric nurses) to use physical force to ensure compliance. 
 Although Graeber does not discuss pedagogy, he helps to make sense of how 
teachers/professors can be viewed as bureaucrats rather than pedagogues. Graeber also argues that the 
police are bureaucrats who enforce bureaucratic rules such as driving rules and only rarely get directly 
involved in violence, perhaps when there is paperwork involved or when their position is questioned by 
a dissenter. Under similar logic, despite the abstract value of an authentic love of learning in teaching, 
teachers are supposed to teach and many do teach their students the practice of following arbitrary 
rules (bureaucracy) for instrumental ends (e.g., money, good grades, parents’ approval, high test scores, 
getting institutional credits and credentials, access to desired jobs and institutions), underpinned by the 
threat of violence – usually soft violence.   
Over-assessment and testing regimes, based on the behaviorist reward-and-punishment system, 
teach students how to work without meaning. The students’ work outcomes (or homework) can be 
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simply thrown away because it does not have any “use-value” for the students or the teachers (see 
Sidorkin 2002).  Both corporate and public bureaucracies demand from the students much meaningless 
and unimaginative work. There is only limited scope for “imaginative labor” in society – e.g., organizing 
the means of production or creative problem defining/solving, – which disproportionately goes to 
managerial and professional elites.  
The mass education system is more useful for a training in a labyrinthine of bureaucracy (e.g., 
following prepared scripts in call-centers, working on a production line, marking scripts according to a 
rigid set of the marking grade criteria), with rarely tested values at their heart, and with a threat of 
violence as the means of compliance. As we will discuss later, this may change with the advent of 
technology, but for now, vast swathes of the workforce work in strict rule-following jobs such as call-
center work. Bertrand Russell told in a letter to a friend of his experiences as a visiting academic at 
Harvard in 1914. He wrote that the atmosphere among scholars there encouraged “quick results, 
efficiency, success – none of the lonely hours away from mankind that go to producing anything of 
value,” and goes on to add that the professors at Harvard were “more alert and business-like and 
punctual than one expects very good people to be!” (Monk, 1996, p. 347)3. 
If this is the societal context of education, then it is all the more important to reflect on the role 
of violence in sustaining this education (non-voluntary, unconditional cooperation with educational 
authorities) and to examine ways in which it may be creatively dialogued with. 
 In our classification, the nature of the pains/pedagogical violence can have diverse aspects and 
which is worse depends on the laws of a particular society (e.g., corporal punishment is still legal in 
Singapore, Malaysia, Middle-East) and some private schools in the West (e.g., Australia) while more 
subtle forms of punishment are available more generally in the English speaking world. To make a 
tentative list of the everyday forms of pedagogical violence available: physical (e.g., beating – corporeal 
punishment), physiological (e.g., making student starve), psychological (e.g., humiliation, shaming), 
social (e.g., ostracism, public humiliation, scapegoating, exclusion, disrupting parent-child relations), 
emotional (e.g., making student depressed), economic (e.g., withholding economic opportunities or 
resources from a student), institutional (e.g., denying access to a desired institution or an institutional 
practice), sexual (e.g., harassment, rape, exchange of good grades for sex), epistemological (e.g., 
exposure a student to painful ideas or learning activities), and so on. Some of these forms of pedagogical 
violence are institutionally and societally legitimate (e.g., shaming, lawful school corporal punishment, 
denying access to a desired institute, disrupting student-parents relationships), some not legitimate at 
all (e.g., rape, scapegoating, unlawful beating), and some in-between (e.g., making students depressed, 
humiliation). In our view, pedagogical violence can be achieved by diverse means: corporal punishment, 
low grades, suspension, expulsion, withdraw of recommendation, reporting to parents, yelling, sarcasm, 
sexual harassment, cutting recess time, withdraw of relationship, disrupting relationship with peers 
and/or parents, referral to the principal, giving assignments, separating friends, and so on. Again some 
of these means are viewed by the society and institutions as legitimate, some illegitimate (if not even 
criminal), and some are in-between. We will consider examples of pedagogical violence that are 
currently viewed as legitimate by the society below. These various pains, including physical, are always 
psychological in their nature to be effective and may even lead to dysconscious awareness of the 
pedagogical violence (Sihra & Anderson, 2010). “Dysconsciousness” refers to an uncritical acceptance of 
inequality (or pedagogical violence as it is in our case) as given, necessary, and unchangeable.  
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Of course, not all violence that occurs in schools is necessarily pedagogical, and pedagogical 
violence can occur outside of school. For example, some personal fights and bullying that occur in school 
may not be pedagogical in its nature because the school context may be accidental to the violence. 
Personal violence among students may not be pedagogical if it is not used to submit the students to 
unconditional educational cooperation. On the other hand, parents may inflict pedagogical violence on 
their children (e.g., by forcing homework, teaching reading, toilet training) even outside of school.  
Some non-pedagogical violence can be a by-product of the rigid and unilateral organization of 
conventional educational institutions violating human ecology and human freedoms (e.g., forced 
participation, school/classroom crowdedness). This type of violence can emerge in educational settings 
as a result of violation or neglect of human ecology and not necessarily a means or a result of 
pedagogical imposition. Conventional schools are often very crowded spaces with regimented time, 
assigned activities, and forced collectivity that do not allow much for students’ (and teachers’) initiative, 
creativity, voluntary segregation, mobility, negotiation, choice-making, non-participation, and flexibility. 
A conventional teacher is often caught in (or thrown into) a “kaleidoscopic” type of instructional 
environment in which the teacher cannot easily discern the events which take place therein (Jackson, 
1968). Often the primary task that many conventional teachers experience is to establish, manage, and 
negotiate their unilateral control over their students through “defensive teaching” (McLaren, 1993; 
McNeil, 1986; Sidorkin, 2002). It is often insensitive to the needs of its participants. Some aspects of the 
organization of the conventional educational practices put students in the relationship of competition 
among each other for the teacher’s attention, public class floor, grades, praises, and so on. Conventional 
school ecologies and organization may generate “natural” tensions and micro- and macro-aggressions 
leading to pedagogical violence as a response to these tensions and non-pedagogical violence.  
It is important to mention that pedagogical violence affects different social groups differently. It 
may have additional, secondary functions beyond ensuring students’ unconditional cooperation with the 
teachers’ and school’s pedagogical demands. Pedagogical violence may help domesticate, colonize, and 
sort “wild” students who do not fit well the feminized white middle-class school institutional 
environment – working-class, minority (especially African American in the US), disabled, and males. 
Sociologists have documented the use of such pedagogical violence among working-class students 
(Willis, 1981) and involuntary minorities (`e.g., "acting white" phenomenon among some African 
American students, Fordham & Ogbu, 1986) but it is not limited to these social groups. 
Finally, some pains and discomforts rooted in learning may not be pedagogical in their nature. 
For example, pains rooted in athletic sport drills or intellectual challenges and frustrations may not be a 
result of pedagogical violence because they do not necessarily involve the student’s submission to the 
teacher’s pedagogical desires. 
Physical pedagogical violence: disciplining the student’s body 
In the past, pedagogical violence was mostly physical in its nature. Thus, it was reported that 
famous Russian tsar Peter The Great liked to learn diverse practices like smithcraft, shipbuilding, and so 
on. He signed himself into such practices as a common apprentice at various enterprises in Russia and 
Europe. Often, he was beaten (e.g., slapped) or verbally scolded by his impatient masters for mistakes 
he made. However, he did not punish the masters but rather replied, “Thanks for teaching me!” 
(“Благодарю за науку!”, literally in Russian, “Thanks for science!”). In addition to physical pain, 
psychological pain was used by parents for teaching their children character, morals, and discipline. The 
transgressing children were often sent into the woods to find a rod for their disciplinary beating, for 
which the children had to thank the parent (usually the father) for administrating this corporeal 
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punishment. Children were expected to be thankful for the pain-induced learning that their parents 
caused in them, which is well articulated in the famous English sayings, like “Spare the rod, spoil the 
child,” “No pain – no gain!” As Henderson suggests in Saul Bellow’s Henderson, The Rain King, “Truth 
comes in blows” (Bellow, 1996) or as Salisbury (2004) remarks with regard to medieval education: 
The schoolmaster’s commands, admonishments, and directives accompanied by a blow with a 
rod encourages the student to associate the master’s word with the blow until eventually the 
word and the blow become one (p.145). 
In most countries, school-induced corporal punishment — official physical punishment for 
students’ noncooperation with the educational institutional demands — has been legally banned from 
schools by the end of the 20th century with a striking exception of the United States, where it still has 
remained legal in 19, mostly southern, states and in 2 states it is legal only in private schools (New 
Jersey and Iowa)4. School corporal punishment has involved the infliction of physical pain that is often 
accompanied by social, emotional, and psychological humiliation, social ostracism, and psychological 
distress. The primary purpose of school corporal punishment, in our view, is to drastically achieve the 
conformity of students with the school norms, goals, actions, and requirements.  
However, at times, corporal punishment is a response to a bad, unsafe, ecology in which adults 
find themselves in with children. Thus, parents living in dangerous and unforgiving environments apply 
corporal punishment to their children often to make them avoid social and physical dangers, hardships, 
and risks as well as out of parental helplessness, irritation, and desperation (Freire, Freire, & Freire, 
1994; Lareau, 2003). It has often been designed to have a communal effect of a threat and warning for 
students who might directly not be the object of school corporal punishment but who might be involved 
in future transgressions.  
With the decline of its legality, several issues have emerged.  In certain contexts, physical 
punishment is still acceptable, even though it is officially prohibited.  Interestingly, in Japan, for example, 
Omi (2019) found in a survey of 110 trainee teachers that despite a legal prohibition on corporal 
punishment since 1941, corporal punishment in the context of bukatsu (meaning extra-curricular activity 
particularly sports) was experienced by just over a quarter of his sample and also accepted by 68% of 
these, despite their stance against corporal punishment in general. In the particular context of the rigid 
hierarchy of bukatsu, and the intense periods of time spent on an exclusive activity by non-trained 
coaches, corporal punishment is relatively normal (e.g. one story of 30-40 slaps during the day before 
practice).   
In other contexts, ‘hard’ physical punishment has transformed into softer but also punishing 
violence. Such “softer” forms of pedagogical violence may involve verbal threat, social humiliation, 
referral to the principal and/or parents, detention, suspension, expulsion, punishment by assigning extra 
“learning” work, loosing of recess, lowering grades, and so on. There can be also illegal use of physical 
pedagogical violence directly by the teachers or indirectly mediated by other students. Recent brain 
research has found that some forms of softer violence activates the same areas of the brain as physical 
pains (Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2004). 
At the same time, some students may actively resist the pedagogical regime imposed on them 
by violent (and non-violent) means. They may attack and bully teachers and their peers physically, 
verbally, or virtually (via social media networks) in response to the school pedagogical regime, norms, 
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and demands. The students may skillfully use sarcasm, humor, taboos, teasing, laughter, pranks, hacks, 
shaming, and so on, as powerful weapons against their targets.  
Psychosocial pedagogical violence: disciplining the student’s mind 
 Psychosocial pedagogical violence involves inducement of psychological and social pains in 
students in order to ensure their unconditional cooperation with the pedagogical activities and 
outcomes defined, organized, and imposed by the teachers, school, and society. This is disciplining the 
students’ minds. Psychosocial pedagogical violence may take many different forms but here we limit 
ourselves to considering two most common types of psychosocial pedagogical violence: summative 
assessment and epistemological imposition.  These are of interest to us because they help reveal the 
prosaic everyday forms of pedagogical violence. 
Pedagogical violence of summative assessment (grading) 
 Educational summative assessment is supposed to be an assessment of a student’s competence 
after education has been “done.” Russian American sociologist of education Pitirim Sorokin defined 
school as a “sorting machine” to produce a dynamic class stratification of the society (Sorokin, 1927). 
Summative assessment sorts people on those who will get certain personally desired goodies like access 
to good jobs, good educational institutions, financial aid, and so on and on those for whom these 
goodies will be denied. By its intentional design, summative assessment is inherently unsafe for its 
subjects as it may end up in losses and pains and, thus, can be violent in its nature. As a by-product of 
the pedagogical “soft” violence caused by summative assessment, there is a systematic production of 
pathologized subjectivity in academically failing students (Stojnov, Dzinovic, & Pavlovic, 2008; Varenne & 
McDermott, 1998). Thus, educational summative assessment is pregnant with pedagogical violence by 
its design. While the necessity of summative assessment has been widely recognized in many 
professions – e.g., nobody wants to have inept surgeons, airplane pilots, lawyers, teachers, politicians, 
and so on, – the legitimacy of summative assessment in education is questionable and contested in our 
view (Matusov, Marjanovic-Shane, & Meacham, 2016). In contrast to many other practices, mistakes are 
valuable in education because they become teaching-learning opportunities for students and teachers. 
Punishing students for making mistakes – what summative assessments often does – inhibits students’ 
learning activism and makes teaching difficult because students may try to hide from the teachers their 
own subjectivity: what the students think they don’t know or what the students believe may not be 
correct from the teacher’s point of view (in this vein, it is curious that efforts to bring mistakes into the 
open as learning opportunities within professions such as medicine are also a challenge, see Garbutt, et 
al., 2007). This makes the teachers’ guidance insensitive as teachers may not have access to the 
students’ subjectivity. Some educators argue that legitimate summative assessment of people’s 
competence has to be done outside of education.  By doing that summative assessment does not 
interfere with learning while providing legitimate gatekeeping against risky ineptitude. For example, the 
mastery of driving a car is summatevely assessed not by driving teachers but by the Department of 
Motor Vehicles. Similarly, the matery of practicing the law is summatevely assessed not by the law 
professors but bythe Bar Association. However, in our view, there should be a “firewall” between 
education and summative assessment to avoid it undermining learning, guidance, and teacher-students 
trust so necessary in education (Matusov, 2009). 
 However, educational summative assessment may have another goal and function in education, 
besides and beyond summative assessment of students’ competence after institutional education is 
“done.” This goal is making students comply with the teachers' and institutional non-negotiable 
educational demands. A colleague of mine (the first author) admitted that she administered a lot of 
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consequential tests and quizzes in her classes (7-10 multiple-choice scan-ready tests/quizzes per a 14-
15-week semester), contributing to the final grade (i.e., summative assessment). She revealed that the 
primary purpose of these summative tests is to make her students come to her class meetings, take 
notes during her lectures, and read the assigned literature (homework). From the point of view of my 
colleague, most, if not all, of her students would not engage in necessary learning activities and studies 
on their own – the point we will return later in our paper. In her classes, summative assessment is the 
punishment and reward system to force the students to study. Thus, summative assessment is designed 
here to secure psychosocial pains in the students, who might not be obedient enough from the 
teacher’s point of view.   
 Teachers often try to instill students’ desire for good grades and a fear of low grades in students 
by reminding students about consequences of the grades on their future, by trying to incorporate 
grades in the students’ self-esteem and identities, by creating competitions among the students for 
scarce good grades (e.g., so-called “grading on the curve”) and/or by using grades to promote or disrupt 
the students’ relations with their parents. As a high school student who moved from an innovative 
middle-school without grades to a conventional school with grades noticed,  
I got really upset the other day because I was talking with one of my teachers about how grades 
were horrible. … To sum it up, it was just me ranting on about how I don’t like grades, and if 
everybody got As, there’d be no point in using the grade system, but they instituted it so people 
feel bad when they get a bad grade (DePalma, Matusov, & Smith, 2009, p. 951). 
However, not all students, especially working-class and minority students, care about grades, not seeing 
them as valuable rewards or punishments for themselves (Eckert, 1989; Willis, 1981). This forces 
teachers to constantly look for other means of pedagogical violence and pedagogical bribery.  
 Finally, summative assessment has the potential to deprive students of engaging in critical and 
creative thinking. It suppresses students’ authorial agency and their own judgment because it is always 
the external agency of the test that defines the truth and not them. Summative assessment promotes 
what Bakhtin called “authoritative discourse” at the expense of “internally persuasive discourse” 
(Bakhtin, 1991). The holistic educators Sharon Solloway and Nancy Brooks argue that summative 
assessment in education leads to the “standardization and instrumental application of knowledge,” 
which is “akin to violence” (Solloway & Brooks, 2004, p. 43). Michael Strawser elaborates on why this 
constitutes pedagogical violence, arguing that summative assessment forces “students to think about a 
question in one particular way and to confine their answer, for example, to a limited number of 
multiple-choice or rubric options” (Strawser, 2009, p. 57). French philosopher Paul Ricœur argues that 
any monologizing and totalizing text (rooted in summative assessment) is based on violence to suppress 
alternative and challenging ideas and questions (Ricœur, 1975). 
As a consequence, summative assessment in education inhibits students from reflecting on their 
own subordinated position in society, preventing any liberating activism on the part of the students. In 
part, it is because the psychological pain of summative assessment causes students to doubt 
themselves, to believe that they are incapable of something, and even to hate themselves. But also 
some students with good grades may think that they are knowledgeable when their knowledge is 
shallow and their subjectivity “hollowed out” (Eisenhart & Allen, 2016). 
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 To link back again to our root metaphor of sadomasochism. From the Foucaultian perspective of 
pastoral power5 (Foucault, 1983), the self-sacrifice involved in embracing pain is bound up with the 
system of (self) examination or summative assessment; which could be read as a confession to the 
pastoral power (teacher) of one’s investment in and dues paid to ”the knowledge” where ”the 
knowledge” is located in a space of pastoral power. 
Epistemological pedagogical violence 
Knowledge can be painful. Some educators view the pain of knowledge as evidence of deep 
authentic education and, thus, as a desirable instruction for students’ intellectual and personal growth. 
This new knowledge (new epistemological vista, new paradigm) can undermine one’s existing comfort, 
one’s existing ontology, one’s existential being, and even one’s well-being. Consider, for example, 
Socrates' notion of "torpedo touch," as one of the most sophisticated epistemological pedagogical 
violence that was described: 
Meno: If I may venture to make a jest upon you, you seem to me both in your appearance and in 
your power over others to be very like the flat torpedo fish, who torpifies those who come near 
him and touch him, as you have now torpified me, I think. 
Socrates: As to my being a torpedo, if the torpedo is torpid as well as the cause of torpidity in 
others, then indeed I am a torpedo, but not otherwise; for I perplex others, not because I am 
clear, but because I am utterly perplexed myself. 
…. 
Socrates: If we have made him [Meno’s Slave whom Socrates just taught geometry] doubt, and 
given him the "torpedo's shock," have we done him any harm? 
Meno: I think not. 
Socrates: We have certainly, as would seem, assaulted him in some degree to the discovery of 
truth; and now he will wish to remedy his ignorance, but then he would have been ready to tell 
all the world again and again that the double space should have a double side. 
Meno: True. 
Socrates: But do you suppose that he would ever have enquired into or learned what he fancied 
that he knew, though he was really ignorant of it, until he had fallen into perplexity under the 
idea that he did not know, and had desired to know? 
Meno: I think not, Socrates. 
Socrates: Then he was better for the torpedo's touch? 
Meno: I think so (Plato & Jowett, 1937, electronic version). 
We call the pain that Socrates caused by creating disorientation in the student “epistemological 
pain.” This pain, psychological in its nature, is very real. In its extreme, epistemological pain, 
undermining a student’s existence, may lead to suicidal thoughts in some students. This is how one of 
my (the first author) former students described the consequences of my Socratic teaching through 
“torpedo touch,”  
Jane: i guess it [this dialogue] becomes obsessive such that it interferes with other aspects of 
life… i dunno Edward, it's so weird and hard to explain but it feels like a ball and chain like a drug 
or an addiction or something…  maybe it's just me though? maybe i'm too sensitive? like with 
my lack of community behind and other [personal] issues i have in my life… [these internal 
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dialogues prompted by Edward are] like all related to all this stuff… it's all so very penetrating… 
excuse the French, but it's like a mindfuck. because maybe it does conflate with personal issues i 
have, but i'm sure other people have similar issues, so some of your other students could have 
or could be suffering like me…. but i'm sure it's worse on grad students than undergrads…  i 
think you are very good at asking very important and penetrating questions… and sometimes 
you can get people to question their existence or their ways of living or why they're doing what 
they're doing, etc etc…  you have that blessing that is a curse maybe…  
Edward [i.e., Eugene]: Of course, by now you can imagine me asking, "What is wrong with that -- 
i.e., asking about life?”... 
Jane: because i wonder if you could question someone to despair or death? (Matusov & Brobst, 
2013, p. 82, spelling is original). 
Another type of pedagogical epistemological pain may involve intentional humiliation to 
promote desired learning in a student. For example, in accordance with this Socratic pedagogical 
method, a US educator Jane Elliott, famously known for her anti-racist instruction “The eye of the 
storm” (Infinito, 2003), humiliates a White female college student to learn about a systemic problem of 
racism6 . The White female student in the video does not appreciate this learning, accusing her of 
racism, – publically humiliated, she ran away from the classroom in tears – but her White peers seem to 
side with Elliott, despite the observable pains caused by Elliott in them. When we shared this video with 
our educationalist colleagues and students (future teachers), they were split7 on the legitimacy of using 
public humiliation to confront a student’s hidden “racism” (some educators disagreed that the student 
manifested any racism in the episode). Some educators consider pains coming from epistemological 
violence as legitimate when it leads to the “student’s growth.” However, other educators argue that it 
can be legitimate only with the student’s consensus as it was in the case of Meno (Matusov & Brobst, 
2013; Matusov, Marjanovic-Shane, & Gradovski, 2019). 
Recently, there have been debates about epistemological pedagogical violence in US colleges 
(Shulevitz, 2015, March 15). The debate is about whether university professors have the pedagogical 
right to violently disrupt the students’ dearest ideas and upset their psychosocial and emotional well-
being (Lukianoff, 2013). On the one hand, is a critical examination of students’ dearest ideas and 
prejudices not the primary goal of a good education?! On the other hand, this good education can break 
the students’ existential well-being. For example, one of my undergraduate students in a teacher 
education program (the first author) suggested our class study issues of suicide in education. However, 
when the class selected this topic, she asked my permission not to come to the class because of her 
personal traumatic experiences with suicide. The important education for future teachers that she 
promoted was too emotionally traumatic for her. I granted her permission (although in my classes, 
students always have the right not to attend a class meeting while doing learning compensations 
instead). I had a similar experience with a student who asked not to come to my class because we were 
going to discuss issues of rape. Being a rape survivor, the topic was too traumatic for her. 
On the other hand, an ultra-religious teacher education student asked my permission not to 
attend my class on sex education. I convinced her to attend because she really wanted to teach in public 
schools and not in religious private schools, although the choice was always hers. I do not believe in 
forced education. I also believe in students’ academic freedom not to learn what they do not want to 
                                                          
6 See the video documenting Elliott’s Socratic teaching on racism among college undergraduate students in the US 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=neEVoFODQOE. 
7 Readers can also follow the YouTube discussion below the video.  
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learn while being informed about the consequences of their educational choices (Matusov, 2020, in 
press-a). 
Students’ ambivalence about pedagogical violence 
 Once I (the first author) asked my undergraduate students, future elementary school teachers if 
they would like to design education for themselves without being forced to study. Most (but not all!) of 
my students said “no” mostly because they did not trust themselves that they would study on their own. 
One student even insisted that if she had not forced to study, she would not have got up from her bed 
at all. “Many novice students became anxious about trusting themselves, if the institutional oppression 
suddenly disappeared, calling not having grading, ‘going to the Dark Side’” (Ana Marjanovic-Shane, 
personal communication, 2018). Of course, it is unclear if those students’ lack of educational activism, 
educational desire, educational will, educational agency is a result of those students’ nature – even their 
genetic and/or culture makeup (so to speak) – or a result of the conventional educational system itself, 
heavily based on pedagogical violence, where for their formative 12-16 years, young people are robbed 
of their decision making about and ownership of their own life and education (Llewellyn, 1998; Neill, 
1960).  
 Many students accept the “no pain, no gain” masochistic ideology of conventional schools and 
are proud of their own academic achievements rooted in surviving painful pedagogical violence. Wear 
(good) grades with pride, like soldiers proud of the scars from the battles, or like tattoos worn by the 
former prison inmates. Toughness of the pedagogical regime of the class – the pain and suffering it 
inflicts on students – can become marks for students’ quality of character: endurance, academic 
aspiration, and status. Thus, a high school student would refuse to take a hypothetical “magic learning 
pill” that would make them instantaneously, effortlessly, and painlessly competent and knowledgeable 
in a desired practice because, “Because sports in Spain is very popular, and kids that are very good at 
that get a lot of respect and usually get always picked by the teams and things and if I took the pill, it 
would be all too easy and would not have any merit in it” (Matusov, Baker, Fan, Choi, & Hampel, 2017, 
p. 471).  For us, such a magic learning pill could work to good effect in the short-term – like a headache 
pill could cure a headache – but produce long-term problems, such as a loss of desire to love knowledge 
through intimate acquaintance. 
 Students’ ambivalence about pedagogical violence creates opportunities for pedagogical abuse 
(including sexual abuse8 ) – and even pedagogical sadomasochism, when a teacher enjoys, or 
professionally learns to enjoy, causing pedagogical pains in a student, while the student enjoys, or 
“professionally” learns to enjoy, and appreciates the pedagogical pains inflicted on him or her by the 
teacher in the name of quality education. Arguably, this normative pedagogical sadomasochism is a 
pedagogical abuse in its own turn because, despite the consent and mutual enjoyment of the 
pedagogical pains, the student is deprived of genuine education that is not based on a desire to inflict 
(pedagogical) pains. Bourdeau would probably qualify this pedagogical sadomasochism as “symbolic 
violence” – “the violence which is exercised upon a social agent with his or her complicity” (Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992, p. 167). Symbolic pedagogical violence is rooted in the entire structure of the 
conventional schooling and cannot be addressed by pure enlightening the students, 
Because the foundation of symbolic violence lies not in mystified consciousnesses that only 
need to be enlightened but in dispositions attuned to the structure of domination of which they 
                                                          




are the product, the relation of complicity that the victims of symbolic domination grant to the 
dominant can only be broken through a radical transformation of the social conditions of 
production that lead the dominated to take the point of view of the dominant and on 
themselves (Bourdieu & Nice, 2001, pp. 41-42). 
 Even more, pedagogical pain seems to become a definitional of the quality of education. For 
example, a faculty promotion and tenure committee praised a candidate because he often failed many 
of his students while his students, many of which had failed the course or got poor grades, provided 
highly positive anonymous feedback on his teaching at the end of their classes. This almost 
sadomasochistic feature of education – teacher desire to fail as many students as possible to set up the 
high standards and the rigor of education and the students’ appreciation of the pain of being 
academically failed – become a hallmark of the pedagogical quality of teaching. It is important to 
investigate further how common the sadomasochistic attitudes among both students and teachers. 
Teachers’ desire to avoid pedagogical violence 
Is the elimination of pedagogical violence possible and even desirable in education (what one 
could call a “legal argument” before a trial)? Our look at pedagogical violence is open to the accusation 
of ”condescension” – an attitude of patronizing superiority – outlined by Worsham (1998) and Bourdieu 
and Passeron (1990). Efforts to minimize or eliminate pedagogical violence, for example, by effacing the 
hierarchical differences between teachers and students or distributing power of the curriculum across 
everyone in the classroom evenly, even though well-meaning, may still reproduce the dominant 
pedagogy of violence. For example, weakening or eliminating a vertical teacher-students hierarchy may 
lead to the emergence of a horizontal student-student hierarchy with not less but more violence. When 
in his pedagogical experiment, Lensmire weakened his teacher authority during his writer workshop in a 
2nd-grade classroom, some “popular” White middle-class students created scapegoats out of their less 
popular minority working-class classmates to make their texts laughable for the rest of the class 
(Lensmire, 1994a, 1994b). Arguably, sometimes teacher-based vertical pedagogical violence rooted in 
hierarchy – what Graeber (2015) called “structural violence” – can be softer, more just, and less 
omnipresent than students-based horizontal pedagogical violence rooted in democracy. 
Another possibility is the risk of “token change.” With “token change,” there may be nominal 
power over the curriculum by the students or a sense in which they can participate equally with the 
teacher, but the structure of the students’ emotional life (such as feelings of inferiority or superiority) is 
such that these are felt as rare privileges, further solidifying the dominant pedagogy elsewhere in the 
school or teacher-control in the alternative pedagogy. For example, there is an innovative pedagogical 
practice of “learning contracts” (Knowles, 1986), in which students are supposed to identify the process 
and content of student learning with the help of the teacher: “A learning contract is a collaboratively 
written agreement between a student and a faculty member that delineates what is to be learned, how 
it will be learned, and how that learning will be evaluated”9. In our assessment, the learning contract 
practices are consistent with the Progressive education paradigm of manipulating an “educated subject” 
(Fendler, 1998), in which students are put into a position in which they acknowledge goals, values, and 
limitations tacitly imposed on them by teachers as their own. In essence, we argue that learning 
contracts create an illusion of freedom of choice and negotiability in the students, but govern them by 
guilt (Hargreaves, 1994) that necessarily emerges in students when they have transgressed “their own” 
signed contract (Matusov, von Duyke, & Kayumova, 2016).  
                                                          
9 http://www.wpi.edu/Academics/ATC/Collaboratory/Idea/contractbenefits.html  
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Similarly, Sihra and Anderson (2010) suggest that conventional pedagogies often assume 
legitimate knowledge as singular and superior and violently oppose alternative perspectives. 
Nonetheless, Worsham (2013) would probably suggest that Sihra and Anderson’s (2010) remedy – 
“ahimsa” from Mahatma Gandhi, meaning “do no harm,” may not overcome these “patterns of feeling” 
(e.g., of superiority/inferiority among some students and teachers) precisely because it suggests a 
change of orientation and attitude in an emotional field while ignoring relations of domination and 
subordination through historical and institutional realities or operating a pedagogy of “condescension” 
of assumed equality amid manifest inequality. 
Similarly, other work which has attempted to reduce or efface pedagogical violence through, for 
instance, encouraging open democratic spaces with minimal teacher intervention or intervention to 
improve listening skills and humanism, while keeping alienating instrumental education in-tact,  (e.g., 
Mokeyeva, Zakirova, & Masalimova, 2015) falls foul of the same critique of some kind of collusion with 
the dominant pedagogy through promoting what could possibly end up being “token” change rather 
than a genuine change of heart among teachers and students alike. 
Many teachers want students’ submission to unconditional cooperation through voluntary 
means (Labaree, 2003). Students’ voluntary submission involves a certain degree of negotiation 
between the student’s and societal desires (Sidorkin, 2002, 2009). We argue that voluntary means 
include three major possibilities (and their mixture). First is honest persuasion when a student becomes 
convinced to submit his/her will for the educational unconditional cooperation by arguments. Often 
students are reminded of the benefits of the imposed education for their future well-being and at times 
about the usefulness of the imposed education for their present. When students are convinced of the 
benefits of education for them, they can willingly participate in the education designed for them by 
trusting the pedagogically unilateral decisions by the teacher. The main problem with this approach is 
that honest arguments are always conditional and imply a real and legitimate possibility to not 
cooperate if an honest argument turns the other way – otherwise, argumentation turns into 
manipulation abusing students’ lack of certain knowledge, which Bourdeau would define as “symbolic 
violence” (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990). Also, it is difficult to engage in honest argumentation about the 
benefits of education with students, who are viewed as ignorant and intellectually inept by the 
conventional definition. Finally, if students can appreciate education via argumentative persuasion, why 
must they subordinate themselves to educational cooperation unconditionally?! In other words, the 
honest regime of argumentation and persuasion makes teacher-student cooperation conditional by 
default.  
Second is open bribery when a student gets (or is promised to get) what she or he wants in 
exchange for her or his unconditional cooperation. Students’ unconditional cooperation can be bribed10 
by good grades, by money, and by favors valuable to the students (e.g., engaging into extracurricular 
activity, teacher-student meaningful socialization and friendship, field trips, extra points toward grade 
mark, providing extra recess time, excusing from assignments) (Sidorkin, 2002, 2009). The main problem 
with open bribery is that it is expensive, requiring more and more resources to give away to the student, 
and not reliable in the long run as the student’s desires transform. Also, one common problem with 
these two approaches is that even when they are successful in enlisting a student’s desire to 
unconditionally cooperate, the student may still have problems to deliver this unconditional cooperation 
because it may take too big toll on the students’ psychological well-being and will or simply undoable for 
                                                          
10 Sometimes, when bribes are expected, withdrawal of bribes/rewards can be perceived by a student as a 
punishment, which can become pedagogical violence. 
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the student. How long can one submit 100% of her or his own will, mind, heart, desire, communication, 
and agency even when one tries intentionally to do that?! Total submission often breaks or severally 
damages the student’s authorial agency on a long and may lead to addiction, depression, and/or 
violence (Wilensky, 1960). 
The third approach is employed by Progressive Education that tries to make unconditional 
educational cooperation genuinely intrinsic. It involves wrapping the imposed education (but especially 
imposed curriculum) in learning activities that are very attractive to the student so the students cannot 
resist but willingly participate in them. Dewey called this process of making students engage in the 
society-defined curriculum “double psychologizing” (Dewey, 1956). The learning activities should be 
designed by educators in such a way as to generate intrinsic motivation in all students in all curriculum 
topics all the time by promoting excitement, curiosity, interest, fun, entertainment, collaboration, and 
friendship in the students. As the Progressive American educator and psychologist Bruner wrote, “...any 
subject could be taught to any child at any age in some form that was honest” (Bruner, 1986, p. 129). 
The educational imposition is wrapped in the student’s choice. Young students may not want to do 
arithmetic drills but they may like to play video arcade games that may require these repetitive 
arithmetic problems as a part of the fun game. Learning becomes mostly by-productive for the students 
– carefully and purposefully embedded in students’ games, projects, play, and other activities of the 
students’ choice. This approach by Progressive Education is arguably manipulative. The forerunner of 
the Progressive education, French writer Jean-Jacques Rousseau, rather cynically placed manipulation in 
the heart of negotiable instruction to ensure that the societal curriculum is non-negotiably imposed on 
the students is acceptable and desired by them, while not being visible to them (Rousseau, 1979, p. 
120). 
Can good education survive without pedagogical violence? 
Can institutionalized education successfully run voluntarily, -- i.e, ., when students, with or 
without the help of the teacher, decide whether to study, when to study, what to study, how to study, 
what study means for them, and with whom to study? On the one hand, we have some evidence for a 
positive answer to this question. Almost all children learn their native language and their many native 
cultural practices outside of any educational institution, arguably without pedagogical violence (Rogoff, 
2003). Also, there are private democratic schools, in which academic learning is voluntary and often 
organized by the students themselves, that are not based on pedagogical violence (Greenberg, 1991, 
1992; Neill, 1960; Rietmulder, 2009).  
On the other hand, pedagogical experimentation in high education with the Open Syllabus 
pedagogical regime, where students choose classes (for some students and classes) and design their 
own education (Shor, 1996), show a complex picture (Matusov, 2015; Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 
2017). Some (but not all!) students in an Open Syllabus pedagogical regime (often but not always) use 
the class resources (the allocated time and efforts) for other demands of their life – mostly survival and 
necessities – even when they highly value the class for their own personal and professional growth. 
Below are two Open Syllabus students’ unsolicited reflections on their Open Syllabus classes, 
In short, I am having a terrible semester. I have bit off more than I can chew in having a 
part time job and taking 2 honors classes as well as extracurricular activities. When I miss class it 
is because I am either working extra hours at work or I am cramming for my next exam. I realize 
I have not been the ideal participant in our class but I can assure you I do really enjoy our 
EducXXX class and the topics we discuss. Urban education is a passion of mine and I looked 
forward to this class until I became so stressed this semester. It probably obvious to you, as well 
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as to myself, that because of our open syllabus and "no grades" policy, that I have used this class 
as a cushion for my heavy workload. I apologize because I know I have taken advantage of what 
was supposed to beneficial to my learning and our class. I don't know how to make up for the 
class time that I have missed except to tell you that I really have enjoyed what I have been there 
for and that I have tried to use webtalk to understand the days I missed. I hope you see that 
when I am in class I enjoy participating and have a lot to offer (email [to the instructor], 
November, 2012) (Matusov, 2015, pp. A198-A199). 
I’ll say it [the Open Syllabus class] 100% doesn’t work for me and I’ve learned that this 
semester. … I’m not a stressed out person, but I put a lot of on my plate often [including] this 
class clearly for me, which was a class that I was expecting to be my favorite. I mean I still love 
your class, but… [I was] expecting it to be … the class I put the most effort in, because it’s a topic 
I’m most interested in and it got completely pushed to the side for me and I [have] consciously 
realized that the entire semester. But also [I] just couldn’t compromise my grades [in my other, 
non-Open Syllabus, classes] and my work… I have a job … and my other stuff and I was like… well 
that’s – this unfortunately is the thing that gets significant […] and I needed that. That’s awful… 
(Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2017, p. E12). 
It seems that when the Open Syllabus pedagogical regime is embedded in the life of a student 
full of many concerns about survival and necessities, the student’s own high commitment to his/her 
own highly valuable and even potentially pleasurable desire becomes weak. Self-defined education 
without pedagogical violence may require a different type of lifestyle that is based on leisure and not on 
survival or necessities (the Greek original word “school” meant “leisure”). Also, it can be that many 
formative years spent by the students in conventional institutions, based on non-negotiable impositions 
and pedagogical violence, have traumatized and suppressed students’ educational agency. Some 
democratic educators who observed this phenomenon argue for special “school detox” or “alienation 
vacation” for the students, letting them doing nothing for some time before their educational agency 
and activism can kick on (Greenberg, 1991; Llewellyn, 1998; Matusov & Brobst, 2013; Neill, 1960). These 
concerns forced my colleague and I to retreat from our pedagogical experiments into the Opening 
Syllabus pedagogical regime, where we start with providing only limited choices and limited decision 
making to our students and then gradually open the regime for more and more decision making, 
democratic governance, and ownership for our students. The Opening Syllabus regime is still based on 
pedagogical violence – teacher’s unilateralism in decision making imposed on the students through 
threats of grade demerits at the beginning of the class – being consented by the students in the middle 
of the semester (unless some of them – a small minority – choose to switch to Open Syllabus) (Matusov, 
2015; Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2017). 
Alexander Sidorkin criticized conventional schooling for the use of a feudal regime of power 
based on violence to make students study – i.e., pedagogical violence11 (Sidorkin, 2002). He argues that 
education is primarily public, a societal endeavor to culturally and economically reproduce the society, 
rather than a personal endeavor of the student’s self-improvement or social mobility. That is why, 
Sidorkin argues, student’s study is a form of alienated labor that must be monetarily compensated if we, 
the society, want to avoid pedagogical violence as the major form of students’ motivation to study. 
Sidorkin proposes replacing current feudal relations in education with capitalist relations.  
                                                          
11 Although Sidorkin did not use the term “pedagogical violence” in his book – just “violence” or “school violence,” 
in our view, he meant and described pedagogical violence. 
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Essentially, through his policy of monetary compensation of students’ studies, Sidorkin suggests 
replacing social pedagogical violence mostly directed by teachers with students’ self-inflicted 
pedagogical violence. Students will be paid to force themselves to unconditionally cooperate with non-
negotiable imposition of curriculum in order to produce learning outcomes desired by the society while 
they can choose instruction and the rest of the pedagogical regime for themselves. 
This reveals the primary source of pedagogical violence. Pedagogical violence is a natural 
consequence of alienated, instrumental. education. When curriculum is defined, designed, and imposed 
by society, pedagogical violence is unavoidable. When education is viewed as cultural reproduction – 
i.e., training and strict socialization in targeted practices – rather than student’s authorial production, 
pedagogical violence is unavoidable. Thus, we think that in our society based on the instrumentality of 
survival and necessities, pedagogical violence can be avoided in a very limited number of cases and on a 
limited scale in particular local relations, classrooms, and schools. We argue that pedagogical violence 
can be avoided only when education becomes primarily a personal voluntary endeavor of self-
improvement, self-transcendence, self-growth, and self-actualization of culture-making, rather than a 
societal endeavor of cultural reproduction. However, for that, society has to move from being survival 
and necessity-based to leisure-based living. As pointed out above, the Greek word “school” means 
leisure. The notion of school-as-leisure emerged in Ancient Greek slavery-based society where free-
from-labor citizens had the luxury of engaging in a special type of leisure, named education – a leisure 
pursuit of critical examination of life, self, world, and society (Arendt, 1958; Plato, 1997). Currently, 
technological advancement in robotics and artificial intelligence may create similar conditions for a 
labor-free society (or at least a hybrid), where genuine school-as-leisure can re-emerge (Brynjolfsson & 
McAfee, 2011; Kaku, 2011, 2014; Markoff, 2015; Matusov, 2020, in press-b; Zhao, 2009).  It is an 
interesting empirical question whether a culture of “active leisure,” including leisure of genuine 
education, will emerge in a labor-free society on a mass scale as some scholars predict (Arendt, 1958; 
Gorz, 1989; Keynes, 1930/1963; Markoff, 2015; Marx, Engels, & Pascal, 1947; Pink, 2005; Zhao, 2009) or 
it will continue a pattern of mass “passive leisure” (i.e., idling, rest, or passive consumption of ready-
made cultural activities and products). 
 Addressing pedagogical violence: Carnivalesque authority of internally persuasive 
discourse 
This brings us finally to approach the question of axiology from another perspective – that of 
Bakhtin’s dialogism (Bakhtin, 1999), interpreted here as ethics. “The Good” (education) and “The Bad” 
(violence) are unfinalized rather than finalized truths. Education can be bad in some cases and 
pedagogical violence (like any other violence) can be good in some other cases. Let us give examples of 
that. 
Education can be bad and undesirable in some cases. For example, when a person crosses a 
street without watching for car traffic, the best immediate action is to pull the person physically back on 
the walking pavement rather than to try to educate him or her. Sometimes non-educational and/or 
educational instrumental goals have to take an emergency priority or even completely replace 
educational goals. Metaphorically speaking, at times, a teacher should prioritize safety and VIOLENTLY 
pull the student back to the pavement, without trying to educate the student about the danger of 
crossing the road without looking around. Yes, all this is true. HOWEVER, it is important to abstract the 
unique sphere of EDUCATION and claim that in the educational practice this sphere has to be prioritized 
ON AVERAGE (but not necessarily in each and every case) (Matusov & Lemke, 2015). For example, it may 
be a good idea for a teacher to assume the role of a policewoman to stop immediate student-student 
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bullying in order to prioritize students’ well-being and peace in the classroom community. However, as 
an educator, the teacher has also a unique professional duty to engage the students in education about 
bullying. 
Similarly, pedagogical violence can be good and desirable in some other cases. Important 
education can be painful. It can be painful physically (like in many athletic, physical education but not 
only), intellectually (by challenging the student’s own dear ideas), ontologically (by undermining the 
student’s being), socially (by disrupting the student’s relations with relevant others), and so on. Socrates 
was executed for inflicting pedagogical pains on the ancient Athenian society by challenging its uncritical 
dominant status-quo. A colleague of mine (the first author) reported a case when some Canadian 
progressive educators engaged their First Nation students in a critical analysis of patriarchal and 
hierarchical communal relations, challenging the traditions of their home First Nation indigenous society 
that struggles to survive. 
 The issue of consent is key to understanding the complexities of carnivalesque authority. 
Considered in a binary way, good pedagogical violence should have consent from the students (they 
should give consent rather than not give it) but not necessarily from the rest of society. Of course, this 
consent is not always possible to secure because neither the teacher nor the student may know in 
advance that education may cause pain. This is consistent with Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic violence. 
However, the teacher can communicate to the student that it is his or her right to end any pedagogical 
pain that he or she experiences. The student’s academic freedoms to define his/her own education 
(Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2019) and his/her consent for a pedagogical violence may prevent the 
teacher’s abuses of power rationalized by the benefits to the student who may be still ignorant of these 
benefits. In this case, pedagogical violence has to become a part of education itself – a critical 
examination of it. 
In a non-binary sense, however, rather than stop the topic at the gates of non-consent, (e.g. 
tying one’s identity to being “not good at math” and not wanting to upset this identity and so choosing 
not to consent to math class leading to a pedagogically violent response), it might be worth the attempt 
to dialogically de-crown this non-consent in some way; even trying to get to understand from within the 
resistance (including students attempting to question the teacher’s resistance or each other’s resistance 
to the curriculum – open or closed – or methods of teaching, assessment or appearance in school). 
Developing an “internally persuasive discourse” (Bakhtin, 1991; Matusov & von Duyke, 2010), as a form 
of life, may take some time because it involves moving out of one’s comfort zone and playing with a new 
identity (knowledge and identity inter-relate). While ‘no means no’ in life, in education, it is slightly 
different considering the large doses of regret that adults occasionally feel about their lack of interest in 
school, later on in life, or equally in teachers who resist curriculum innovations. There is an ethics of care 
towards these later selves (see Sullivan, Smith, & Matusov, 2009 on a more in-depth exploration of the 
carnivalesque in education; Taylor, 1989 on the “future self”).   
Our emphasis on consent (to the carnivalesque) as a playful area of exploration offers a 
distinction to Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic violence which, while useful, assumes a more binary 
understanding of consent (with full knowledge of violence, consent can be given or not given). 
Nonetheless, the ethical question remains of how playfully one can explore consent considering the 
asymmetry between the teachers’ authority and that of the students in the class. Morson (2004) and 
Matusov (2007; 2015) argue that authority in general and teacher authority in specific are necessary in 
the pedagogical regime of internally persuasive discourse. The teacher ought to provide the 
epistemological, pedagogical, organizational, and safety leadership. However, this leadership has a 
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temporary but systemic character. The teacher authority jumpstarts internally persuasive discourse, in 
which everybody, including the teacher, is equally an ignorant learner, only to die in its intensity and 
then to be reborn again at its temporal exit. In our view, this rehabilitation of authority in internally 
persuasive discourse salvages the Bakhtinian notion of carnival from horizontal violence by peers and 
communal prejudices, from epistemological ignorance, and from pedagogical chaos. Thus, initially, 
students may accept the teacher’s guidance simply because the teacher has an institutional role. 
However, if the teacher’s guidance did not prove to be useful and appreciated by the students, this trust 
would be withdrawn. When the teacher engages the students into discussion, the students have to 
make their own mind about argumentation presented to them by the teacher, the other students, and 
themselves and not by the teacher’s institutional or epistemological authority. Two plus two is four not 
because the teacher said so or because it is the correct answer for the test but because the student 
freely and without any manipulation comes to this conclusion him/herself assisted by the teacher, other 
students, and his/her own reasoning (i.e., Bakhtin’s “internally persuasive discourse”). Only when the 
teacher proves that his or her guidance is useful for students’ making their own informed mind, the 
teacher gets more credit and trust for his/her pedagogical, organizational, and epistemological 
authority. Of course, this internally persuasive discourse – a public critical dialogue – cannot be imposed 
on a student, who should have a legitimate choice to participate in it voluntarily and can legitimately 
withdraw from his/her participation in it at any time. Finally, the ideological power of critical dialogue, 
succinctly articulated in Plato’s Apology by Socrates, “The unexamined life is not worth living” (Plato & 
Riddell, 1973), has to be challenged in and out of this dialogue. Thus, as Kukathas (2003) convincingly 
points out with his example of a Muslim fisherman, unexamined life can be worth living while the 
examined life may not be worth living.  
However, at its best such “internally persuasive discourse” also offers a counter-argument to 
Worsham (1998)  and Bourdieu and Passeron (1990). For these authors, power and authority are static 
or reproduced inter-generationally. These structures of power/feeling may generate counter-discourses 
to sustain their hegemony but this hegemony itself is non-generative and unchanging. Our conception of 
“temporary and systemic” authority/power is regenerative. It is regenerative because Bakhtin’s 
“internally persuasive discourse” can shape power/authority, not just in an intellectual way, but in a 
carnivalesque, participatory fashion. The threat of carnivalesque violence and chaos demands 
modification in the order of things – as hegemony is “grounded” or “accentuated” by participatory 
inquiry. Carnival admits to the possibility of “condescension” as a temporary horizontalization of power 
rather than as a self-deceptive power-grab. All alternative wrong and “stupid” ideas become important 
building blocks for truth. One cannot fully understand why 2+2 is 4 until one considers other 
possibilities, why they are wrong, and limitations of its truthfulness (e.g., two friends plus two friends 
does not necessarily result in four friends). “De-crowning” what we hold dear – our interests, our 
identity, our communal values, our habits of thinking, – does not need to be violently painful; there is 
potential for it to be painfully joyful (cf. “laughing until stomach pain”), when participants interested in 
and value it.  
We acknowledge that education cannot be completely painless. Physical and psychosocial pain 
can be intrinsic to some type of learning. Pain and violence can be also intrinsic to instruction and a life 
of learning community (Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2015). This kind of axiological position leads to a 
complicated ethics around pain and violence in education – one where violence climbs down from a 
zone of Plato’s transcendent instrumentality (e.g., rules) to a zone of particularity – where acts are 
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authored by those with “a non-alibi in being” (Bakhtin, 1993) who are responsible in the ethical 
enterprise of developing an internally-persuasive discourse, in which these ethical deeds are challenged. 
However, we argue that pain and violence in conventional education are not equal to 
pedagogically imposed violence because pedagogical violence is aimed at ensuring the student’s 
unconditional and total cooperation with the teacher’s, school’s, and society’s pedagogical demands to 
produce the learning outcomes, desired and preset by the society. Education as internally persuasive 
discourse does not involve this unconditional cooperation and curricular endpoints preset by the 
society. The pedagogical regime of internally persuasive discourse is democratic, voluntary, and open for 
the students’ input, ownership, negotiation, and legitimate freedom of non-guilty divorce and non-
participation. Finally, emerging pains and violence in education are humanized in dialogue of collective 
meaning-making and democratic decision making (Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2015). 
Conclusions: What can we do with pedagogical violence? 
 We define pedagogical violence as inflicting physical or psychosocial pains on students in order 
to ensure their unconditional cooperation with the pedagogical regime unilaterally imposed by teachers, 
school and society. Secondary pedagogical violence also includes inflicting pains in response or in 
resistance or as a by-product of the primary pedagogical violence. Pedagogical violence can be initiated 
by teachers, school administrators, police, students, and parents. Pedagogical violence can occur outside 
of school, for example, at home.  It involves violence to promote or result from the imposition of 
pedagogical processes desired by the authority. However, pedagogical violence does not include pains 
and discomforts that may be intrinsic to learning itself. 
 We have identified the main cause of pedagogical violence in the instrumental, reproductive, 
and impositional nature of modern mass education and even some innovative education. When 
education is not initiated by, consented with, and democratically dialogically negotiated with the 
students, learning becomes alienated. Alienated learning creates conditions and necessities for 
pedagogical violence. When curriculum (what to study) and education (whether to study) are defined, 
designed, and imposed by society on the students, pedagogical violence unavoidably becomes a tool of 
this imposition. 
 We have abstracted several current approaches to pedagogical violence: 
1. Softening, humanizing, and minimizing pedagogical violence 
In accordance with Foucault’s (1995) observation, schools have been moving from physical to 
psychosocial pedagogical violence. Although Foucault challenged the idea that psychosocial violence is 
“softer” and “more humane” than physical violence, this seems to be the dominant view, at least among 
the middle-class mainstream. Physical discipline and punishment of children as such by parents, schools, 
and strangers become more and more associated with abuse, while psychosocial discipline of mind is 
not necessarily12. 
Nevertheless, there have been growing voices to minimize psychosocial violence associated with 
suspensions, detentions, and expulsions to what is minimally necessary. The disproportional application 
of pedagogical violence to particular social groups like minorities (especially for African American males 
in the US), working-class, and males raises issues of how much pedagogical violence services other 
functions such as domestication and colonization of these groups by feminized white middle-class 
                                                          
12 At the same time there is a counter-current of nostalgia for a physical punishment, with “a personal and caring 
touch” – i.e., so-called “tough love,” – over cold, calculative, and often irresponsible bureaucratic psychosocial 
punishments of “managing populous.” This sentiment can be found in Foucault (1995). 
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ideologies (Kupchik, 2016). Yet, in our view, this approach does not try to address the root of the 
problem, namely alienated, instrumental, reproductive, imposed education, and its view of violence is 
too static – not considering the possibility of “cyclical” pedagogical violence. 
2. Replacing pedagogical violence with pedagogical manipulation 
Progressive education offers another solution for pedagogical violence. It tells us to find ways to 
engage students in the curriculum preset by society. In essence, progressive education wishes to 
develop ways to make the student genuinely want to study what the society wants the student to study 
– using a Foucaultian term, to create “the educated subject” (Fendler, 1998). In our view, this move 
involves the replacement of pedagogical violence with pedagogical manipulation of the student’s 
subjectivity for the student to unconditionally accept the present societal curriculum. The students’ 
background, interests, home culture are exploited to teach the preset societal curriculum, which may 
remain deeply irrelevant for the student. We agree with Sidorkin (2002, 2009) that this pedagogical 
manipulation cannot be always successful – it cannot work for every student in every circumstance with 
every preset societal curriculum. Thus, progressive education always incorporates pedagogical violence 
and cannot avoid it entirely if the curriculum and education itself are unconditionally imposed on the 
students. 
3. Internalization of pedagogical violence 
Sidorkin (2002, 2009) and some other educators propose to pay students for their alienated 
studies, required by the society for its cultural, social, economic, and political reproduction, like workers 
are paid for their alienated labor, required by the economy (and capitalists). Thus, feudal relations of 
violence, on which many conventional and innovative schools are based, should be replaced by capitalist 
relations of contractual monetary compensations. In our view, this proposal does not eliminate 
pedagogical violence but transforms it from social and relational to internalized and self-inflicted. Like 
the three previous proposals, this proposal does not eliminate the main conditions for pedagogical 
violence but rather softens, minimizes, and curbs it, which, in our view, is a nontrivial achievement. 
4. Student academic pedagogical rights movement 
Emerging from the college students’ protests of the Civil Rights movements in the 1960s in the 
US and elsewhere (AAUP, 1968), there has been growing interest in development of the Student Rights, 
especially in higher education13. Often the student rights are focused on curbing pedagogical violence, 
like for example, the right to protection from discrimination, or the right to protection from verbal or 
written abuse (AAUP, 1968). Students’ freedoms and rights usually were defined holistically (e.g., 
freedom of assembly, religion, expression) and there was little attention to pedagogical academic 
aspects of the student life. However, recently, the student rights movement has started challenging 
many academic pedagogical practices of alienated education (Marjanovic-Shane & Matusov, 2017, 
February), such as summative assessment, redefined as illegitimate and violent “pedagogical voyeurism” 
(Matusov, Marjanovic-Shane, et al., 2016) or “the surveillance of learning” (Macfarlane, 2013), and 
preset curriculum, unilaterally defined and designed by the teachers, schools, and society (Greenberg, 
1992; Matusov, 2015; Neill, 1960). In our view, the student academic pedagogical rights movement 
pushes for the total transformation of education that we discuss in the next section (Matusov & 
Marjanovic-Shane, 2019). Arguably, it does this through an exercise in practical imagination (Graeber, 
2015) where the impossible is suddenly possible. However, this carries with it the risk of a re-
organization of bureaucracy (and the violence that goes with enforcing it – a too often tragic 
                                                          
13 See, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Student_rights_in_higher_education.  
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consequence of revolutions). In our final section, we discuss the relevance of cycles of carnivalesque 
authority of internally persuasive discourse to this issue. 
5. Carnivalesque authority of internally persuasive discourse 
Some democratic dialogic educators (Matusov, 2007, 2009; Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2012; 
Morson, 2004; Sullivan, et al., 2009) propose the pedagogical regime of “internally persuasive discourse” 
(Bakhtin, 1991; Matusov & von Duyke, 2010), in which “truth becomes dialogically tested and forever 
testable” (Morson, 2004, p. 319) as an alternative to pedagogical violence. Students are invited to 
democratically define and negotiate their curriculum (Matusov, 2015). However, as Morson (2004) and 
Matusov (Matusov, 2007; Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2015) show education based on the 
pedagogical regime of internally persuasive discourse cannot be sustained without the teacher authority 
that provides epistemological, pedagogical, and organizational leadership, the (un)usefulness of which is 
evaluated and judged by the students. This leadership goes through the cycle of birth, death, and rebirth 
– carnivalesque crowning and decrowning the teacher authority – in internally persuasive discourse. As 
we discussed above, this process may not be completely painless but this pain, like pain that maybe 
inherent in some particular learning, stops being pedagogical pain because it is not aimed at ensuring 
the students’ unconditional cooperation with the teacher’s demands but is based on ethical 
responsivity. However, in our view, education, defined as internally persuasive discourse, cannot be 
possible on a large scale in a society based on labor and work of people acting as smart machines 
(Arendt, 1958; Ford, 2015; Markoff, 2015; Mitra, 2013). 
We welcome all five approaches to softening, humanizing, curbing, replacing or eliminating 
pedagogical violence. However, we believe that unless alienated, instrumental, reproductive, societal, 
imposed education will be replaced with intrinsic, critical, productive, ontological, personal, and 
voluntary education, the conditions for pedagogical violence will remain. Unfortunately, the latter type 
of education cannot flourish in a society based on the survival, necessities, and labor/work of people 
acting like smart machines. Fortunately, technological advances may create conditions for a leisure-
based (or at least hybrid) society, in which personal intrinsic education of leisurely pursuit of critical 
examination of the self, life, world, and society will become possible on a mass scale.  
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